

The legacy of war: The effect of militias on postwar repression

Supplementary Appendix

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A1 Summary and descriptive statistics

A1.1 Summary statistics


TABLE A1.1 Summary statistics

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Physical integrity rights violations	Categorical	1140	2.80	0.74	2.00	4.00
PGM inherited from conflict	Count	1115	0.64	1.37	0.00	11.00
PGM new to post-conflict	Count	1115	0.30	0.72	0.00	6.00
Civil war _{duration}	Count	1142	9.16	8.57	1.00	37.00
Civil war _{intensity}	Binary	1142	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
Conflict termination _{type}	Categorical	1142	2.92	0.79	2.00	4.00
PKO _{presence}	Binary	1142	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Executive constraints	Continuous	1127	4.36	1.94	1.00	7.00
Government change _{tag}	Binary	1142	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
Physical integrity rights violations _{tag}	Categorical	1140	2.83	0.75	2.00	4.00
Free media _{tag}	Binary	1142	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
GDP _{log}	Continuous	1142	8.21	1.02	4.90	10.57
Population _{log}	Continuous	1142	9.32	1.37	5.97	14.13
Peace years	Continuous	1142	9.76	7.70	1.00	34.00
Peace years ₂	Continuous	1142	1.54	2.11	0.01	11.56
Peace years ₃	Continuous	1142	30.56	57.35	0.01	393.04

A1.2 Political Terror Scale distribution across types of peace


Figure A1.2 shows the distribution of the Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney 2010) for two scenarios. The light gray bars represent countries that did not experience any armed conflict, while the black bars stand for countries that were involved in a civil war during the preceding decade. Peace spells without prior conflict (gray) are characterized by no or only limited repression (mean PTS=2), while peace in post-conflict societies (black) most commonly experience extensive political imprisonment and some political executions (mean PTS=3). This begs the question of what contributes to a more “repressive peace” in these fragile environments.

FIGURE A1.2 Average values of Political Terror Scale across peace types



A1.3 Frequency of post-conflict observations in our sample

FIGURE A1.3 Frequency of post-conflict observations over time



A1.4 Distribution of post-conflict episodes and PGMs by conflict termination type

TABLE A1.4.1 Distribution of post-conflict episodes by conflict termination type

Episodes	No PGMs	PGMs	Total	Percentage
Government victory	10 (41.6%)	14 (58.4%)	24	19.36%
Rebel victory	9 (75.0%)	3 (25.0%)	12	9.68%
Settlement	20 (40.0%)	30 (60.0%)	50	40.32%
Low intensity	16 (42.1%)	22 (57.9%)	38	30.64%
Total	55	69	124	100%

Note: Row percentages are within brackets.

TABLE A1.4.2 Distribution of post-conflict episodes with PGMs by conflict termination type

Episodes	Relation to previous conflict	
	Inherited from conflict	New post-conflict
Government victory (n=24)	37.5%	37.5%
Settlement (n=50)	48.0%	24.0%
Low intensity (n=38)	52.6%	26.3%

Note: Figures estimated for post-conflict episodes with Pro-government militias present. Percentages do not add to 100% because a given post-conflict episode may have more than one type of PGM present at the same time.

TABLE A1.4.3 Distribution of post-conflict PGMs by their relation to the government

PGMs	Semi-official	Informal	Total
Inherited from Conflict	40.18% (45)	59.82% (67)	100% (112)
New to post-conflict	38.46% (25)	61.54% (40)	100% (65)
Total PGMs	70	107	177

Note: Figures estimated across the 66 post-conflict peace episodes with pro-government militias. The unit of analysis here is PGM.

A2 Models with alternative dependent variables and modeling strategy

Fariss (2014) argues that data collected from human rights reports (such as the Political Terror Scale) may not offer reliable information on human rights practices. This is mainly the case because “(1) government authorities have an incentive to hide the use of these policy tools and (2) observers and activists use countervailing strategies in order to reveal, understand, and ultimately change repressive practices for the better” (Fariss 2014, 297). This generates systematic temporal bias in standard models of repression given the variation over time on standards of accountability.

Fariss (2014) offers an alternative latent measure based on information from multiple sources to overcome these limitations.¹ The result is a continuous measure where positive values indicate more respect for physical integrity rights while negative values indicate more abusive behavior of the government against the civilian population. We use this measure as a dependent variable to replicate the estimations from Model 1 in Table 1. Given the panel structure of the data with temporal variation, we address concerns of multicollinearity, and autocorrelation and heterogeneity reporting estimation results for models with clustered standard errors and panel clustered standard errors respectively. Negative coefficients for the Fariss (2014) latent measure in Table A2.1 corroborate the main findings from Table 1.

We also use this estimation technique to replicate our analysis on the five-point Political Terror Scale. This dependent variable may be considered as a continuous outcome given the consecutive values of the scale (Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters 2004).

¹For more information, see Fariss (2014, 2018). For a critique of this measure, see Cingranelli and Filippov (2018).

TABLE A2.1 OLS estimations for the level of human rights violations in post-conflict societies based on Model 1 in Table 1—alternative dependent variable including regional fixed effects

	<i>Dependent variable: Fariss (2014)</i>		<i>Dependent variable: PTS (1-5)</i>	
	Cluster SE (1)	PCSE (2)	Cluster SE (3)	PCSE (4)
PGM inherited from conflict _{count}	-0.071* (0.035)	-0.088** (0.015)	0.053† (0.028)	0.055** (0.019)
PGM new to post-conflict _{count}	-0.146* (0.069)	-0.142** (0.043)	0.081 (0.081)	0.085 (0.067)
PKO _{presence}	-0.139 (0.085)	-0.163** (0.057)	0.199* (0.095)	0.207* (0.082)
Executive constraints	0.077* (0.031)	0.084** (0.015)	-0.054† (0.031)	-0.056* (0.024)
Government change _{tag}	-0.058 (0.071)	-0.052 (0.049)	-0.045 (0.106)	-0.046 (0.101)
Physical integrity rights violations _{tag}	-0.355** (0.040)	-0.215** (0.032)	0.501** (0.056)	0.483** (0.067)
Media freedom _{tag}	0.218* (0.091)	0.204** (0.053)	-0.140† (0.081)	-0.142 (0.092)
GDP _{log}	0.056 (0.065)	0.102** (0.028)	-0.048 (0.059)	-0.052 (0.038)
Population _{log}	-0.112** (0.025)	-0.142** (0.017)	0.134** (0.027)	0.138** (0.026)
Peace years	0.219 (0.163)	0.167 (0.178)	-0.448 (0.495)	-0.452 (0.382)
Peace years ₂	-7.846 (6.198)	-4.823 (6.790)	17.894 (19.138)	17.878 (14.668)
Peace years ₃	0.904 (0.707)	0.531 (0.758)	-2.081 (2.182)	-2.073 (1.663)
Constant	1.157† (0.610)	0.642* (0.319)	0.810 (0.628)	0.870† (0.498)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.74	0.67	0.57	0.56
Rho		.47		.03
Number of clusters	67		68	
Number of observations	415	415	429	429

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

A3 Models with step-wise exclusionary criteria for post-conflict duration

TABLE A3.1 Ordered logit estimations for the level of human rights violations in post-conflict societies based on Model 4 in Table 1—step-wise exclusion of post-conflict episodes based on their total duration

<i>Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Rights Violations</i>						
Excluding post-conflict episodes of maximum duration of (in years):						
	1	<=2	<=3	<=4	<=5	>=10
PGM inherited from conflict _{count}	0.214** (0.076)	0.214** (0.080)	0.221** (0.083)	0.199* (0.089)	0.162† (0.094)	0.235** (0.073)
PGM new to post-conflict _{count}	0.172 (0.240)	0.187 (0.248)	0.126 (0.237)	0.109 (0.246)	0.123 (0.241)	0.597** (0.229)
PKO _{presence}	0.229 (0.232)	0.143 (0.229)	0.155 (0.239)	0.151 (0.257)	0.160 (0.258)	0.549 (0.348)
Executive constraints	-0.165* (0.069)	-0.150* (0.069)	-0.122† (0.068)	-0.116† (0.070)	-0.112 (0.074)	-0.257* (0.104)
Government change _{tag}	0.521† (0.315)	0.559† (0.322)	0.718* (0.348)	0.682† (0.356)	0.690† (0.358)	-0.097 (0.463)
Physical integrity rights violations _{tag}	1.766** (0.183)	1.754** (0.186)	1.765** (0.192)	1.771** (0.188)	1.792** (0.189)	1.581** (0.255)
Free media _{tag}	-0.361† (0.211)	-0.376† (0.206)	-0.418† (0.226)	-0.486* (0.229)	-0.421† (0.229)	-0.412 (0.341)
GDP _{log}	-0.114 (0.117)	-0.093 (0.118)	-0.118 (0.127)	-0.104 (0.127)	-0.151 (0.130)	-0.176 (0.175)
Population _{log}	0.413** (0.075)	0.407** (0.076)	0.423** (0.077)	0.402** (0.077)	0.424** (0.078)	0.413** (0.130)
Peace years	-0.123 (0.358)	-0.097 (0.350)	0.123 (0.365)	0.021 (0.366)	-0.036 (0.382)	-0.698 (0.545)
Peace years ₂	2.333 (7.578)	2.117 (7.420)	-1.568 (7.753)	0.616 (7.856)	1.685 (8.147)	15.590 (12.047)
Peace years ₃	-0.115 (0.478)	-0.114 (0.469)	0.081 (0.486)	-0.045 (0.494)	-0.101 (0.511)	-1.086 (0.792)
Cut 1	6.544** (1.310)	6.732** (1.333)	7.248** (1.330)	7.080** (1.365)	6.951** (1.408)	4.092** (1.563)
Cut 2	9.438** (1.347)	9.645** (1.377)	10.095** (1.383)	9.898** (1.412)	9.813** (1.455)	7.347** (1.641)
Wald χ^2	231.07**	224.27**	199.61**	206.75**	210.96**	122.79**
AIC	1010.55	980.88	915.69	892.86	862.68	433.81
Number of clusters	66	63	61	58	56	42
Number of observations	665	643	601	577	562	281

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed test).

A4 Models with alternative operationalization of *pro-government militias*

TABLE A4.1 Ordered logit estimations for the level of human rights violations in post-conflict societies with alternative log of counts operationalization of *PGM inherited from conflict* and *PGM new to post-conflict*

	<i>Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Rights Violations</i>					
	Short term			Medium term		
	[5 years post-conflict]			[10 years post-conflict]		
PGM inherited from conflict _{ln(count)}	0.474* (0.221)	0.412† (0.228)	0.469* (0.223)	0.427* (0.197)	0.350† (0.198)	0.435* (0.202)
PGM new to post-conflict _{ln(count)}	0.461 (0.509)	0.458 (0.508)	0.442 (0.515)	0.307 (0.426)	0.270 (0.416)	0.313 (0.422)
Civil war _{duration}		0.003 (0.012)			0.002 (0.011)	
Civil war _{intensity}		0.425 (0.448)			0.625 (0.418)	
Gov. victory _{termination}			0.125 (0.388)			-0.048 (0.351)
Settlement _{termination}			0.071 (0.275)			-0.088 (0.260)
PKO _{presence}	0.369 (0.281)	0.367 (0.278)	0.380 (0.270)	0.237 (0.237)	0.219 (0.234)	0.247 (0.236)
Executive Constraints	-0.184* (0.083)	-0.195* (0.084)	-0.187* (0.090)	-0.163* (0.072)	-0.176* (0.069)	-0.157* (0.077)
Government Change _{tag}	0.164 (0.408)	0.154 (0.397)	0.164 (0.409)	0.450 (0.299)	0.448 (0.301)	0.443 (0.302)
Physical Integrity violations _{tag}	1.759** (0.231)	1.726** (0.236)	1.759** (0.233)	1.758** (0.178)	1.719** (0.174)	1.760** (0.178)
Free Media _{tag}	-0.428† (0.244)	-0.376 (0.241)	-0.430† (0.251)	-0.350† (0.205)	-0.294 (0.198)	-0.337 (0.210)
GDP _{log}	-0.115 (0.130)	-0.119 (0.128)	-0.115 (0.128)	-0.133 (0.119)	-0.134 (0.120)	-0.140 (0.112)
Population _{log}	0.403** (0.085)	0.418** (0.096)	0.416** (0.092)	0.405** (0.078)	0.424** (0.085)	0.397** (0.090)
Peace years	-1.714 (1.670)	-1.662 (1.685)	-1.698 (1.674)	-0.192 (0.332)	-0.217 (0.335)	-0.194 (0.336)
Peace years ₂	60.476 (65.279)	57.936 (65.981)	59.892 (65.428)	3.458 (7.186)	3.772 (7.219)	3.519 (7.325)
Peace years ₃	-6.392 (7.519)	-6.092 (7.600)	-6.335 (7.538)	-0.174 (0.460)	-0.190 (0.461)	-0.178 (0.469)
Cut 1	5.112** (1.658)	5.154** (1.659)	5.292** (1.787)	6.173** (1.305)	6.179** (1.297)	6.029** (1.429)
Cut 2	8.037** (1.645)	8.086** (1.651)	8.219** (1.778)	9.053** (1.336)	9.074** (1.337)	8.910** (1.456)
Wald χ^2	177.70**	180.75**	202.58**	237.49**	233.98**	255.74**
AIC	664.93	667.68	668.75	1045.79	1045.61	1049.63
Number of clusters	68	68	68	68	68	68
Number of observations	429	429	429	681	681	681

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed test).

A5 Alternative model specifications

A5.1 Models with pro-government militias

TABLE A5.1 Order logit estimations for the level of human rights violations in post-conflict societies

	<i>Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Rights Violations</i>					
	Short term			Medium term		
	[5 years post-conflict]			[10 years post-conflict]		
PGM _{count}	0.211** (0.076)	0.200* (0.083)	0.212** (0.078)	0.183* (0.076)	0.158* (0.078)	0.191* (0.077)
Civil war _{duration}		0.011 (0.013)			0.008 (0.012)	
Civil war _{intensity}		0.258 (0.440)			0.534 (0.411)	
Gov. victory _{termination}			-0.005 (0.391)			-0.143 (0.346)
Settlement _{termination}			-0.054 (0.279)			-0.172 (0.258)
PKO _{presence}	0.253 (0.282)	0.249 (0.283)	0.268 (0.270)	0.152 (0.234)	0.144 (0.233)	0.160 (0.234)
Executive constraints	-0.165* (0.080)	-0.176* (0.082)	-0.161† (0.086)	-0.147* (0.069)	-0.165* (0.066)	-0.138† (0.074)
Government change _{lag}	0.115 (0.419)	0.139 (0.411)	0.109 (0.420)	0.432 (0.303)	0.444 (0.304)	0.422 (0.305)
Physical integrity rights violations _{lag}	1.822** (0.235)	1.794** (0.239)	1.824** (0.237)	1.797** (0.182)	1.760** (0.177)	1.798** (0.181)
Free media _{lag}	-0.486* (0.243)	-0.427† (0.240)	-0.475† (0.249)	-0.398* (0.202)	-0.332† (0.196)	-0.379† (0.208)
GDP _{log}	-0.155 (0.121)	-0.152 (0.119)	-0.159 (0.120)	-0.153 (0.108)	-0.149 (0.107)	-0.163 (0.102)
Population _{log}	0.389** (0.081)	0.376** (0.094)	0.387** (0.087)	0.399** (0.073)	0.400** (0.082)	0.381** (0.083)
Peace years	-1.716 (1.661)	-1.630 (1.685)	-1.725 (1.664)	-0.152 (0.327)	-0.171 (0.330)	-0.158 (0.331)
Peace years ₂	62.127 (64.867)	58.528 (65.862)	62.494 (64.972)	2.458 (7.170)	2.755 (7.195)	2.646 (7.308)
Peace years ₃	-6.705 (7.473)	-6.287 (7.584)	-6.747 (7.486)	-0.112 (0.460)	-0.128 (0.461)	-0.125 (0.469)
Cut 1	4.853** (1.608)	4.813** (1.605)	4.793** (1.705)	6.087** (1.257)	6.031** (1.242)	5.779** (1.349)
Cut 2	7.777** (1.594)	7.744** (1.596)	7.718** (1.690)	8.967** (1.279)	8.924** (1.274)	8.662** (1.366)
Wald χ^2	176.71**	178.52**	201.94**	230.85**	228.63**	244.11**
AIC	670.25	673.00	674.20	1051.23	1051.44	1054.52
Number of clusters	69	69	69	69	69	69
Number of observations	437	437	437	689	689	689

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed test).

A5.2 Models with semi-official and informal pro-government militias

TABLE A5.2 Ordered logit estimations for the level of human rights violations in post-conflict societies—including *informal* and *semi-official* PGMs

	Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Rights Violations					
	Short term [5 years post-conflict]			Medium term [10 years post-conflict]		
PGM informal _{count}	0.337** (0.085)	0.336** (0.091)	0.338** (0.087)	0.361** (0.085)	0.335** (0.080)	0.371** (0.086)
PGM semi-official _{count}	0.067 (0.138)	0.063 (0.139)	0.068 (0.139)	-0.024 (0.129)	-0.028 (0.129)	-0.017 (0.130)
Civil war _{duration}		0.013 (0.013)			0.008 (0.012)	
Civil war _{intensity}		0.132 (0.403)			0.405 (0.340)	
Gov. victory _{termination}			-0.016 (0.386)			-0.161 (0.335)
Settlement _{termination}			-0.045 (0.278)			-0.185 (0.242)
PKO _{presence}	0.139 (0.297)	0.132 (0.297)	0.149 (0.287)	0.031 (0.242)	0.030 (0.240)	0.037 (0.243)
Executive constraints	-0.170* (0.076)	-0.180* (0.078)	-0.167* (0.081)	-0.155* (0.063)	-0.169** (0.063)	-0.144* (0.067)
Government change _{lag}	0.152 (0.419)	0.188 (0.416)	0.148 (0.420)	0.448 (0.302)	0.458 (0.302)	0.436 (0.303)
Physical integrity rights violations _{lag}	1.811** (0.234)	1.790** (0.238)	1.813** (0.237)	1.748** (0.181)	1.721** (0.179)	1.749** (0.181)
Free media _{lag}	-0.479* (0.237)	-0.427† (0.236)	-0.471† (0.246)	-0.396* (0.199)	-0.342† (0.196)	-0.376† (0.208)
GDP _{log}	-0.164 (0.124)	-0.158 (0.123)	-0.167 (0.122)	-0.158 (0.112)	-0.154 (0.112)	-0.169 (0.106)
Population _{log}	0.424** (0.082)	0.401** (0.091)	0.421** (0.086)	0.450** (0.076)	0.441** (0.080)	0.430** (0.083)
Peace years	-1.744 (1.673)	-1.659 (1.701)	-1.753 (1.677)	-0.181 (0.338)	-0.193 (0.339)	-0.188 (0.343)
Peace years ₂	63.022 (65.394)	59.599 (66.570)	63.352 (65.506)	2.873 (7.409)	3.069 (7.408)	3.071 (7.553)
Peace years ₃	-6.816 (7.544)	-6.422 (7.676)	-6.853 (7.555)	-0.136 (0.474)	-0.147 (0.474)	-0.150 (0.484)
Cut 1	4.988** (1.613)	4.924** (1.612)	4.928** (1.721)	6.239** (1.211)	6.162** (1.200)	5.905** (1.332)
Cut 2	7.942** (1.597)	7.886** (1.600)	7.883** (1.704)	9.165** (1.241)	9.094** (1.235)	8.835** (1.355)
Wald χ^2	192.85**	190.87**	225.90**	275.66**	284.72**	311.57**
AIC	668.43	671.22	672.41	1043.26	1044.81	1046.42
Number of clusters	69	69	69	69	69	69
Number of observations	437	437	437	689	689	689

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed test).

A5.3 Models with additional control variables

TABLE A5.3 Ordered logit estimations for the level of human rights violations in post-conflict societies based on Model 1 in Table 1—including control variables for *PGM onset*, the *Cold War*, *PGM former rebels*, *Military expenditure*

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Physical Integrity Rights Violations			
PGM inherited from conflict _{count}	0.208** (0.078)	0.234** (0.083)	0.217** (0.076)	0.227* (0.093)
PGM new to post-conflict _{count}	0.206 (0.302)	0.429† (0.252)	0.272 (0.297)	0.278 (0.294)
PKO _{presence}	0.342 (0.280)	0.215 (0.278)	0.338 (0.283)	0.388 (0.314)
Executive constraints	-0.176* (0.084)	-0.208* (0.088)	-0.171* (0.083)	-0.191* (0.092)
Government change _{tag}	0.089 (0.399)	0.149 (0.427)	0.153 (0.411)	0.175 (0.454)
Physical integrity rights violations _{tag}	1.740** (0.230)	1.708** (0.231)	1.743** (0.230)	1.743** (0.256)
Free media _{tag}	-0.455† (0.249)	-0.577* (0.267)	-0.463† (0.247)	-0.356 (0.280)
GDP _{log}	-0.120 (0.129)	-0.084 (0.130)	-0.121 (0.127)	-0.215 (0.205)
Population _{log}	0.408** (0.085)	0.375** (0.082)	0.400** (0.080)	0.289* (0.124)
PGM _{onset,tag}	0.474 (0.459)			
Cold War _{dummy}		1.170** (0.453)		
PGM former rebel _{dummy}			0.132 (0.808)	
Military expenditure _{log}				0.131 (0.127)
Peace years	-1.694 (1.682)	-1.899 (1.663)	-1.726 (1.687)	-2.169 (1.820)
Peace years ₂	60.313 (65.435)	65.127 (64.633)	60.905 (65.816)	77.262 (70.714)
Peace years ₃	-6.382 (7.517)	-6.725 (7.423)	-6.437 (7.572)	-8.318 (8.100)
Cut 1	5.111** (1.673)	5.553** (1.654)	4.997** (1.650)	4.560* (1.834)
Cut 2	8.046** (1.671)	8.570** (1.639)	7.939** (1.645)	7.434** (1.832)
Wald χ^2	175.66**	170.22**	180.79**	144.53**
AIC	661.81	651.91	663.76	582.55
Number of clusters	68	68	68	67
Number of observations	428	429	429	378

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

A5.4 Models including post-conflict episodes with rebel victory

TABLE A5.4 Ordered logit estimations for the level of human rights violations in post-conflict societies—including post-conflict episodes where the preceding conflict ended with rebel victory


	<i>Dependent variable: Physical Integrity Rights Violations</i>					
	Short term [5 years post-conflict]			Medium term [10 years post-conflict]		
PGM inherited from conflict _{count}	0.249** (0.079)	0.225** (0.081)	0.248** (0.080)	0.238** (0.075)	0.207** (0.073)	0.242** (0.076)
PGM new to post-conflict _{count}	0.336 (0.295)	0.352 (0.293)	0.330 (0.296)	0.182 (0.237)	0.178 (0.232)	0.197 (0.234)
Civil war _{duration}		0.007 (0.012)			0.003 (0.011)	
Civil war _{intensity}		0.419 (0.404)			0.579 (0.403)	
Gov. victory _{termination}			0.085 (0.399)			-0.081 (0.352)
Settlement _{termination}			0.044 (0.277)			-0.162 (0.263)
Rebel victory _{termination}			0.153 (0.391)			0.166 (0.361)
PKO _{presence}	0.422 (0.261)	0.413 (0.258)	0.438 [†] (0.244)	0.213 (0.226)	0.193 (0.223)	0.260 (0.228)
Executive constraints	-0.177* (0.072)	-0.187** (0.073)	-0.177* (0.078)	-0.139* (0.063)	-0.150* (0.061)	-0.128* (0.065)
Government change _{tag}	0.012 (0.331)	0.011 (0.329)	-0.012 (0.343)	0.341 (0.237)	0.333 (0.241)	0.294 (0.245)
Physical integrity rights violations _{tag}	1.550** (0.206)	1.514** (0.210)	1.554** (0.208)	1.585** (0.168)	1.548** (0.164)	1.593** (0.169)
Free media _{tag}	-0.431 [†] (0.226)	-0.377 [†] (0.221)	-0.430 [†] (0.238)	-0.301 (0.185)	-0.246 (0.181)	-0.291 (0.194)
GDP _{log}	-0.138 (0.132)	-0.138 (0.131)	-0.136 (0.130)	-0.166 (0.122)	-0.164 (0.124)	-0.172 (0.114)
Population _{log}	0.395** (0.079)	0.397** (0.092)	0.408** (0.085)	0.380** (0.070)	0.390** (0.078)	0.384** (0.081)
Peace years	-1.368 (1.565)	-1.310 (1.572)	-1.356 (1.568)	-0.288 (0.335)	-0.301 (0.336)	-0.292 (0.338)
Peace years ₂	42.288 (61.152)	39.710 (61.480)	41.893 (61.230)	5.065 (7.230)	5.201 (7.229)	5.135 (7.345)
Peace years ₃	-3.981 (7.028)	-3.683 (7.065)	-3.945 (7.035)	-0.239 (0.459)	-0.245 (0.458)	-0.242 (0.467)
Cut 1	4.421** (1.563)	4.410** (1.563)	4.628** (1.754)	5.171** (1.289)	5.165** (1.277)	5.170** (1.423)
Cut 2	7.294** (1.569)	7.291** (1.572)	7.502** (1.755)	8.002** (1.338)	8.008** (1.334)	8.004** (1.463)
Wald χ^2	187.82**	191.14**	216.26**	241.53**	243.61**	269.08**
AIC	745.29	747.63	751.13	1193.81	1193.76	1198.30
Number of clusters	74	74	74	74	74	74
Number of observations	476	476	476	763	763	763

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country.

[†] p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed test).

A6 Predicted probabilities of *repression* with conflict *inherited pro-government militias*

FIGURE A6.1 Predicted probabilities of *repression* with conflict *inherited pro-government militias* in the fifth year of post-conflict peace



Note: The simulations are based on Model 1 in Table ???. We calculate substantive effects using a scenario in which a country reaches the fifth year of post-conflict peace. The graphs show the predicted probabilities of *repression* for post-conflict countries with 1, 2 or 3 *inherited PGMs* respectively. Other control variables are held at their mean (continuous variables) and median (categorical variables). Thin and thick vertical lines indicate 95% and 90% confidence intervals.

A7 Coding of Pro-Government Militia targets

The PGMD uses news sources provided in LexisNexis as information. This means, it relies on the sources to mention the type of target. Whenever a source reports about a PGM targeting an individual or a group, it is recorded as a target. Coding every single mention of a target and using the group as the unit of analysis reduces the risk that types of targets are missed. Given the extensive categories of possible targets in the PGMD, civilians as targets are likely the result of personally motivated violence by the militia members. If an individual is targeted because she belong to a specific ethnic or religious group, or a potentially threatening profession, such as a journalist or peacekeeper, they are specifically identified. The first bar in Figure ?? captures only those militias that exclusively targeted civilians and no other groups of targets that have specific characteristic.

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